Abstract: This paper attempts to identify from historical and sociological perspectives how coastal engineering has developed. Particular attention is paid to how its theory and practice have developed and are becoming alienated so that they no longer complement each other. It concludes with some possible methods to preclude further separation and bring about possible symbiosis.
Coastal
Engineering developed in what could be called the 'late modern age'. Wave forecasting was developed to support the Allied invasion of Europe in 1944. A large expansion of coastal facilities took place in the 1950s and '60s. The International Conferences on Coastal Engineering (ICCE) began in 1950. Early coastal science and engineering exhibited all the attributes of modern thought. Given time and funding, we thought, solutions could be improved indefinitely. Since funding was available and there was a large need for improvements to shores and facilities the 'Yes, we can' optimism prevailed and was extended even further in time by the introduction of computers.
The onset of a postmodern form of coastal engineering began when confidence in physical modeling (the basic tool of coastal engineers at the time) was shaken. Suddenly, around 1970, it was discovered that models had practical limits; that they could only provide answers to a certain level of accuracy and that larger, more expensive models would not produce much better results. The postmodern concept of uncertainty dawned. This was followed by other realizations. It became evident that numerical models are also limited. Coastal engineers also became aware that what they considered good coastal engineering was not considered to be 'good' by all. They further found that there are no single unique approaches to problems and there are no single, unequivocal answers.
That is where coastal engineering and science are today. In the coastal field there may still be some, who believe that more sophisticated theories and numerical modeling will provide ever better answers, but many scientists and engineers now recognize the uncertainties of our methods and results, and they are aware that it is unlikely that we will be able to produce much better answers in the near future.
Some Basic Concepts of Learning
After this brief history of the development of the coastal engineering discipline, it is instructive to reflect on how learning takes place, with particular reference to coastal engineering and to coastal theory and practice -the theme of this conference. Figure 1 shows the basic learning curve. At the beginning of any new development, learning (the increase of knowledge) is easy and progress is rapid. As time goes on, new knowledge is more difficult to develop and progress becomes slower. Kuhn (1977) describes the development of knowledge as follows. Early development of a discipline consists of the solution of pressing problems. This first stage is characterized by much empiricism. Later, as the field matures, many of the pressing problems have been solved and more sophisticated theories and techniques are developed to articulate and confirm the prevailing paradigm. Kuhn (1962) defines scientific paradigm as how a scientific discipline defines itself (from within). It is represented by a set of recurrent and quasi-standard illustrations of various theories, as revealed, for example, in textbooks, lectures and laboratory exercises. Research simply amplifies and articulates the paradigm better. As the field matures further, science turns inward, becoming a subculture that talks mostly to itself. New work is addressed to peers and adjudicated by peers. Challenges are internally posed and the discipline focuses primarily on improving existing theories and further validating the paradigm (Vick, 2000) . Figure 2 shows Kuhn's ideas superimposed on the learning curve. Obviously these concepts are simplifications that need to be put in context, since not all disciplines evolve along the same path. But, Figure 2 contains essentials that can be applied to science in general and to coastal engineering in particular. Kuhn (1962) also states that science does not advance by smooth progressive improvement of existing knowledge and he defines 'Paradigm Shift'. When research presents anomalies that cannot be adequately explained by the existing paradigm, such anomalies necessitate a change in the paradigm. This normally results in conflict within the science community. A change of paradigm is contrary to the prevailing (modern era) philosophy of incremental increase in knowledge and building of ever greater consensus around the paradigm. Therefore, it may be expected that any anomalies are rejected by the peers as mistakes; the establishment will tend to defend the paradigm. Once the
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Slower Progress anomalies can no longer be dismissed, the old paradigm breaks down quickly and new theories arise from the collapse of the old, forming another paradigma paradigm shift. Examples of paradigm shift are: Einstein's theory of relativity, redefining mechanics; plate tectonics and continental drift theory, redefining geology; and digital photography, replacing photographic plates and film.
The new developments form a sharp break with the old; they are more like revolution than evolution (Kuhn, 1962) . Science, which prides itself on being objective, appears to be in need of (subjective) judgment as well (detection of correspondences and anomalies) in order to continue its development.
Paradigm shift is shown in Figure 3 and is illustrated in Figure 4 through the example of photography. Digital photography is no simple extension of photography with film; it is something entirely different. It represents a clear break with film technology, which could not meet consumer requirements of smaller cameras, shorter development time and compatibility with computers.
Such discipline-changing shifts are not the result of safe research that captures government grants and industry support, as it sets out to validate the existing paradigm. Real shifts in knowledge are brought about by innovative and inspired basic research that gives no promise of pay-off. After a paradigm shift,
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Science becomes a subculture that talks to itself. Works is addressed to peers and adjudicated by peers. Challenges are internally posed. The discipline essentially improves existing theories to validate the scientific paradigm. Knowledge/Development Infancy Solution of pressing practical problems. Much empiricism the development of the older knowledge can actually retrogress as shown by the dashed line in Figure 4 . That happens when knowledge is no longer needed or no longer generates sufficient interest to inspire research and development. 
Where is Coastal Engineering?
To understand advancement of coastal engineering better, we need to look at four learning curves simultaneously -process knowledge, data collection, numerical modeling and physical modeling, as in Figure 5 . In 1970 all the curves, except for physical modeling were quite steep. It made sense to concentrate on the steep curves and to develop numerical modeling (the steepest curve) in particular. The steepness of these three curves was in part due to the introduction of computers. And we took full advantage of the opportunities presented by the computer.
Paradigm Shift
But in 2010, all the curves are quite flat. For 40 years coastal science and engineering have followed a dream. They were enchanted by computers and numerical modeling -new tools, both at the beginning of their development, both promising rapid progress. Progress in numerical modeling has slowed and we are now further along the learning curves for computers, computing and numerical modeling. So we must now broaden our search for possibilities to improve of our art. We cannot (must not) continue along the old paths that were successful since 1970. 
How can we proceed?
Since the learning curves indicate that all major aspects of coastal engineering have reached their old age ( Figures 5 and 6 ), rapid advancement cannot be expected, unless a paradigm shift occurs. To generate such a paradigm shift would require thinking outside the box. Special funding would be needed to foster new, innovative ideas and research; funding that is not tied to publications only. Funding a 'coastal think tank' would be an example. Such funding might not result in major breakthroughs, but without it a paradigm shift will be highly unlikely. Therefore the coastal engineering profession should champion the idea of more radical thinking and funding within the coastal engineering community.
In the absence of such a rare, major advance, there are still many opportunities to develop coastal engineering to meet future needs. This will need a concerted effort on all fronts -process knowledge and theory, physical modeling, numerical modeling and field measurement. Furthermore, we must integrate our tools, people and facilities. Only through such integration, we will be able to take advantage of the strengths of each element.
One major obstruction to such a concerted effort and to integration is that the complexity of coastal engineering has resulted in the development of subdisciplines of coastal engineering. People are forced to specialize and to become expert in a sub-discipline, rather than remain generalist. Examples of such sub-disciplines of coastal engineering are numerical modeling, waves, sediment transport, breakwaters, environmental, dredging, construction, etc. This separation into sub-disciplines is similar to, for example, the earlier separation of engineering into mechanical, chemical, metallurgical, civil, etc. and the subsequent division of civil engineering into structural engineering, geotechnical, hydro-technical, transportation, environmental, etc. It appears to be a 'natural progression' as a discipline matures and becomes more complex. With time, people in each of these sub-areas have tended to develop their own sub-discipline with peers of the same sub-discipline. Eventually, this forms a silo that hardly communicates with engineers in the other such silos of expertise.
The separation of theory and practice
The next two sections will begin to address the theme for this conference: 'Bringing together theory and practice'. Our discipline is coastal engineering and not just coastal science. It is the application of coastal science to practical problems. Therefore, science must be an integral part of coastal engineering. We must integrate science and engineering; we must re-integrate theory and practice. To solve the practical engineering problems of the future, silos of expertise must communicate with each other. It would be even better if the silos were broken down and we revert to a more generalist type coastal engineering, in which theory and practice are completely integrated. But that would set the 'natural progression' clock back, which is not likely to happen.
How did theory and practice become separated? Traditionally, decision making on coastal projects (Kamphuis 2010 (Kamphuis , 2010a (Kamphuis , 2010c involved mainly the project owner, and a coastal engineer, hired to design the project. This engineer was a practical individual who simplified a number of complex phenomena and synthesized the simplified concepts into a design by trial and error. Models were the trial and error tool to optimize the design. Little science was involved in early design. This was the 'infancy' of coastal engineering (Figure 3) . Pressing practical problems were solved mostly empirically. As the discipline matured, the emphasis on research grew and research was carried out for the purpose of improving practical problem solving in the field. This research was closely related to practice and the two were often carried out by the same individuals. Research was mainly carried out at universities, but the university researchers were, generally, also practicing engineers or individuals with considerable practical experience -in fact, practical engineering experience was a pre-requisite for a university engineering appointment. Often university professors were founders and CEOs of engineering firms. University education was also closely related to practice -professors, students and engineers moved freely between the university and the shop floor.
Then, as 'old age' approached, the focus shifted further into the direction of research and in the process, engineering practice and research became separated.
Research was no longer carried out just in support of engineering practice. It became a sub-discipline by itself, firmly embedded in the universities, pursuing the modern era concept of "given enough funding, we can find theoretical solutions to all of coastal engineering's problems -not only for the practical problems". Coastal engineering research began to set its own (internal) challenges. Engineering research in the universities became organized along the same lines as research in the sciences, mainly because research funding for engineering research was patterned after science research funding. Thus engineering research was subjected to peer review, as in Figure 3 , to determine what research should be published. Kamphuis (2010a) showed that research within an academic setting is a refinement process. Each generation of researchers digs deeper and works out the knowledge of the previous generation in greater detail. Because it is not possible to dig deep over a broad area, it is necessary to divide the research topics of the previous generation into smaller units. This results in a narrowing of the coverage by each researcher, as well as a deepening of the research subjects with each generation and this encourages super-specialization, into very small units. In order to be able to judge the merits of a submitted publication, the peers must understand its contents. That means they often belong to the same very narrow super-specialization as the author; they often published on the topic earlier. This is not a very effective and objective review process.
The impact of this (internally imposed and flawed) peer adjudication process is greatly amplified by the universities, where most research and teaching takes place. Universities base hiring and career advancement on the number of publications and citations. That means engineering professors are rewarded for producing papers, (like all other professors), rather than for solving practical engineering problems … and this is the wedge that has forced practice and theory apart. The divide between theory and practice is further amplified by the fact that the actual research is carried out by graduate students and post-doctoral fellows under direction of the professors. These brightest of students are essentially drawn away from practical engineering by the university reward system and raised on a diet of scientific experimentation, writing papers, etc. This is a great incentive for these brightest students to choose careers in research and theoretical development, rather than in engineering practice, which is a foreign culture to them.
The absolute necessity to publish also encourages solving small, focused (research) problems, rather than investigating overall, complex problems, such as found in design .1 It also means that university professors spend as much time as possible on research at the expense of teaching and solving time-consuming practical problems. Thus, their practical engineering experience is limited, which results in the students not being prepared very well for engineering practice.
Practicing engineers, on the other hand, are not evaluated (internally) by peers and by number of publications, but their evaluation is external -by performance and by potential clients. Practicing engineers, therefore, do not benefit much from publishing their work and this results in few practical publications, such as case studies. Practicing engineers also are unlikely to spend time to serve as peers in a review system that only benefits their more theoretical colleagues; therefore the peer review system is normally devoid of practitioners.
In summary, Coastal engineering has come to exist of two very separate worlds (not unlike other professions, such as medicine). There are the practicing engineers who primarily focus on provision of engineering services to clients, and there are the university based research engineers who focus on publication of research results in order to continue their research funding, establish a reputation and make promotion. This difference in focus has resulted in the divide between theoretical research, which is addressed to a review system interested in incrementally advancing the science; and practical engineering, faced with designing ever more complex Physico-Environmental Systems that needs to be supported by ever more complex Socio-Economic Systems (Kamphuis, 2008 (Kamphuis, , 2010 (Kamphuis, , 2010a (Kamphuis, , 2010c .
For the sake of emphasis, the above analysis was purposely black and white. It must obviously be nuanced. For example, many engineering research applications now must show where and how the research may be applied. Other research applications must involve industrial partners. In this way, some of the theoretical research may become useful in the future. Even so, this may only be of limited interest to engineering practice, since for most designs the actual engineering with its theoretical underpinnings is the (relatively) easy part, while communication with stakeholders and gaining project approval have become a very difficult second task (Kamphuis, 2010) . Because of the theoretical research focus at the universities, the students receive little education in the latter type of practical coastal project management (Kamphuis, 2010b) .
Re-integration of theory and practice
For coastal integration to progress so we can solve tomorrow's problems, the various silos of expertise must communicate. And in particular, the widening gap between practice and theoretical development (essentially the gap between engineering practice and the universities) must be bridged. This will not be easy, since the two have become quite separate cultures. Kamphuis (2010a) discusses integration of university education with the requirements of engineering practice extensively. ASCE (2004 and 2007) state that engineering education needs to consist of technical fundamentals, including mathematics, design, sustainability and uncertainty; social fundamentals, such as public policy, social science, business practice and ethics; and skills, such as problem solving, communication and leadership. Additionally, engineering should be taught in the universities, rather than in technical colleges to equip engineers with adequate knowledge of the arts, humanities and social sciences.
The education that engineering students actually receive is often quite different from the above requirements. How can change be brought about?
We must first recognize that both the engineering industry and the universities must function within a market-driven economy. So to bring about any change successfully requires being able to show added value. For example, better graduates will improve the engineering firms, their performance and their reputation. Better graduates also increase the reputation of the university, bringing in better students, larger research contracts, etc. Such advantages need to be clearly translated into economic terms.
There are a number of improvements that can be made simply through closer cooperation between engineering practice and education. Together, they need to recognize the problem of the divide between them and how this cannot continue. Together they must define 'better engineering' and how it can be brought about. Together, they must decide how periodic external reviews of engineering education by the engineering profession can work best. Together, they can change evaluation methods, including evaluation of professors primarily by the number of publications, evaluation of engineers primarily by billable hours, and evaluation of graduates primarily by marks and transcripts. Part of this task also consists of defining procedures to ensure that applicants for new engineering academic appointments are not only evaluated on publications, but that extensive practical experience is a pre-requisite to professorship, tenure, etc. Together, they can encourage and bring about greater interaction on the shop floor: professors and students spend more time in industry and practicing professionals spend more time at the university, either to learn or to teach. They can bring about systems of cross appointments between universities and industry. They can encourage universities to consider more project courses, which are co-supervised by industry. And, probably most importantly, they must develop a methodology that brings practicing engineers into the all important peer review process -reviewing both publications and research funding. Finally, they could also initiate the idea of a think tank to study this complex interaction formally.
This will all be incredibly difficult. It will cost money to both the industry and the universities. Since both have to function within the global market framework, these are major challenges faced by both parties. But the alternative is not an option, because the present poorly functioning system will deteriorate further into a dysfunctional system. Unfortunately, it is easy to see the advantages of the above interactions, but to obtain support for this cooperation, the intrinsic values must be translated into $ values. It must be shown that engineers who can communicate well and are aware of the latest research, and professors and students who have industrial contacts and relevant experience, can save money. It is easy to show that an engineer does not meet her quota of billable time, because of an educational leave, but demonstrating the benefit of better quality engineering graduates that come out of a revised curriculum that was shaped as a result of her professional sabbatical or educational leave, is very difficult. Similarly, showing that a professor's paper production has decreased because he spent more time in practice is easy. Demonstrating the benefits of the professor's broader experience and the greater quality of his graduates is much more difficult (although students appear to have no difficulty recognizing the additional value of a professor who teaches from practical experience, rather than only from textbooks).
Because of the importance of succeeding in the effort to bring about better correspondence between theory and practice and because of its urgency, the coastal engineering profession should seriously investigate the possibility of obtaining funding for such a complex project. Funding will be needed to generate the ideas and definite plans, but also to support the mechanics, such as the exchanges between industry and academia, the possible cross appointments, the joint university-industry task forces necessary, etc.
Progress will be slow. Therefore, beginning this reconciliation process is urgent. Otherwise the coastal engineering profession will not be able to meet future problems in the coastal zone.
